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Abstract
We report on the detailed veriﬁcation of a substantial portion of the Kerberos 5 protocol speciﬁcation. Because it targeted a
deployed protocol rather than an academic abstraction, this multiyear effort led to the development of new analysis methods in order
to manage the inherent complexity. This enabled proving that Kerberos supports the expected authentication and conﬁdentiality
properties, and that it is structurally sound; these results rely on a pair of intertwined inductions. Our work also detected a number
of innocuous but nonetheless unexpected behaviors, and it clearly described how vulnerable the cross-realm authentication support
of Kerberos is to the compromise of remote administrative domains.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The veriﬁcation of cryptographic protocols has come a long way since supporting the Clark–Jacob Library [21] or
even just the Needham–Schroeder public key protocol [36] was a mark of success. In fact, early methods and tools
became impractical as soon as the protocol grew over a handful of exchanged messages. In all cases, the analysis was
carried out at the symbolic Dolev–Yao level [24], a relatively tractable worst-case model, which has however been
criticized for being overly simplistic. More recently, research in protocol veriﬁcation has moved in two main directions:
overcoming the deﬁciencies of Dolev–Yao analysis by taking into consideration the computational characteristics of
actual cryptography [2,6,12,16], and providing high-level (Dolev–Yao style) guarantees for the complex protocols that
are deployed in practice [32] rather than the minimal academic idealizations of the previous generation. This paper
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summarizes a multiyear effort in this second direction. We report on the results of the most detailed formal analysis of
the widespread Kerberos 5 protocol [39,40] to date, and possibly of any deployed protocol.
Kerberos [39,40] is a successful, widely deployed single-login protocol that is designed to strongly authenticate a
client to all the services it may require: it allows a user to log on at the beginning of the day and transparently and
securely access printers, ﬁle servers, remote hosts, etc., for the rest of that day without the inconvenience of explicitly
authenticating herself to them. Initially developed at MIT, with ongoing reﬁnement and extension under the auspices
of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), Kerberos has been adopted by many large companies, universities,
and other organizations, and implementations are available for all major operating systems—Microsoft, which has
included a largely compatible implementation of Kerberos 5 into all its operating systems starting with Windows
2000 [26], declared it will make Kerberos the center of its authentication infrastructure, hence phasing out proprietary
solutions [43].
As typical of real-world systems, Kerberos 5 is not a single protocol, but a complex suite of interacting components:
within the main protocol the client can request a variety of optional behaviors by setting appropriate ﬂags and including
certain subﬁelds. The Kerberos key distribution center (KDC) can grant some or all of these requests, or reject them
altogether by responding with an error message. The cipher to use for encrypted components is similarly subject to
negotiation. Auxiliary protocols take care of administrative duties, such as changing the user password or propagating
such changes toKDCreplicas. Furthermore,Kerberos provides dedicatedmessage formats to protect the communication
with a given service once authentication has succeeded. This is signiﬁcantly more complex than the abstract six line
rendering of Kerberos whose correctness has been scrutinized for many years in the formal methods literature [3,5,35].
While not exhaustive, our work has touched several of these often ignored aspects of a real-world protocol. In
particular, our analysis has considered cipher negotiation, error messages, several optional behaviors, and cross-domain
authentication, i.e., the possibility of a client to authenticate to a server residing in a different administrative domain
than its own. At this stage, we have not examined auxiliary protocols, application-level message formats, nor all the
optional behaviors. We have also refrained from considering timestamps other than those used for authentication as
this aspect has received signiﬁcant attention in the literature [3,5] in the context of Kerberos 4.
This effort was made possible by substantial advances to the methodology of protocol veriﬁcation. First, the inherent
complexity of Kerberos 5, which is typical of real-world protocols, required a formalization language that combined
an unambiguous representation with the ﬂexibility to selectively abstract auxiliary protocol elements. We chose the
language MSR [13,18,25] as our representation vehicle: MSR’s semantics, based on linear logic and multiset rewriting,
ensured the required rigor, while its powerful type system provided the needed abstraction support and ﬂexibility. Sec-
ond, the sheer size of Kerberos required a streamlined veriﬁcation methodology that yielded manageable proofs in spite
of the inherent complexity of this protocol. In this respect, we were the ﬁrst to introduce distinct, but cooperating, math-
ematical tools in a theorem proving context to analyze the authentication and conﬁdentiality aspects of a cryptographic
protocol. This approach proved so effective as to allow us to perform the bulk of our work manually. The separation we
thus pioneered has recently been formalized into a systematic methodology, which recognizes that authentication and
conﬁdentiality properties rely on radically different proof methods, based on different but interdependent logics [19].
Another technique that proved very useful is the coordinated reﬁnement of speciﬁcations, properties and proofs: we
initially established security results for a very abstract formalization of Kerberos 5; we then repeatedly added detail
to this speciﬁcation in such a way that we could propagate it to the properties and proofs and still maintain validity.
Although this combination of proof methodologies was developed for the analysis of Kerberos 5, it is applicable to any
protocol based on symmetric and/or public-key cryptography; we have not yet tried to extend it to constructs that rely
on non-trivial equational theories such as Difﬁe–Hellman exponents. On the other hand, MSR is a generic speciﬁcation
language for distributed systems and has been used not only for the speciﬁcation of numerous protocols [13,18,25], but
also for modeling biological systems [8]. The present work on Kerberos 5 is however the largest MSR speciﬁcation to
date.
All in all, our analysis has shown that Kerberos 5 is a solid, well-designed protocol. Our results include theorems
guaranteeing authentication, conﬁdentiality of session keys, and structural soundness of the protocol when natural
assumptions are met.We have nonetheless observed some curious behaviors—perhaps best described as “anomalies”—
which do not violate the above fundamental properties of Kerberos, but which nonetheless deviate from the expected
runs. Several of these anomalies appear only when taking into consideration low-level features such as client-requested
options. We also have exposed the fragility of cross-realm authentication with respect to the notion of trust: a single
misbehaving Kerberos domain in a cross-realm authentication chain can create havoc.
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The entire work reported here was carried out by hand. An MSR prototype implementation was started towards
the end of this project and has only recently been completed [20]. It will assist us with future efforts by reducing the
time needed to produce correct MSR speciﬁcations. This prototype does not yet provide automated support for the
veriﬁcation methodology described here, although we plan to study approaches for extending the tool in this direction.
1.1. Other related work
The material, summarized above and reviewed in more detail throughout the paper, directly informs our work.
In addition to it, we will now review some other work related to both our methods and the Kerberos protocol.
Our approach to veriﬁcation is based on theorem proving. Our proofs of security properties are inductive, showing
that certain invariants (either absolute or conditional) hold at every step in all possible runs of Kerberos 5, including
multiple, interleaved runs. Another example of this approach is in the work of Paulson et al., with the Isabelle theorem
prover. Their work included analysis of Kerberos 4 and proofs of various secrecy and authentication properties for
that earlier version of Kerberos [3,5]. Our work was done by hand, but we intend to investigate the possibility of
automating parts of it in the future. Indeed, following the results in [19], we suspect that the proof of our theorems
can be automated to a large extent, although that technique still needs to be specialized to our setting. It may even be
possible to automatically derive the authentication and conﬁdentiality statements for speciﬁc classes of protocols.
Other analyses of Kerberos include one by Mitchell et al. [35] of a basic fragment of Kerberos 5 using the state-
exploration tool Mur. This is an example of the model-checking (rather than inductive) approach to protocol ver-
iﬁcation; see also, e.g., [22]. Mitchell et al., found an attack against a restricted fragment of Kerberos 5; this attack
was shown not to be achievable in the full protocol, or even in the fragment examined here. Yu et al. [45] described a
chosen-plaintext attack against Kerberos 4 and a related oracle-based attack on the original speciﬁcation of Kerberos 5.
These two attacks highlight a limitation of our approach, and of every approach based on a symbolic (Dolev–Yao)model
of cryptography: our results here, which show that the design of the basic Kerberos 5 protocol does provide secrecy
and authentication, rely on idealized cryptographic primitives, and therefore do not account for possible imperfections
of implemented cryptosystems.
1.2. Outline of the paper
This paper has the purpose of summarizing the main contributions of this research project, in terms of both the
veriﬁcation methodology used and the security assurances obtained for Kerberos 5. It is organized as follows: in
Section 2 we review Kerberos 5 at the most detailed level examined in our project. In Section 3 we informally present
the main results of this work, concentrating on the major properties satisﬁed by the protocol, the proof techniques we
relied upon, the anomalies we discovered and our ﬁndings on cross-realm authentication. Section 4 gives additional
information on MSR and our veriﬁcation methodology, and presents the details of a typical property and its proof.
With the exception of this last section, which is rather technical even though it omits some of the lowest level details
from theorems and proofs, the tone of this paper is intentionally kept informal, sometimes omitting minor details for
the sake of clarity. The interested reader can however ﬁnd full statements and complete proofs in other publications
related to this project, in particular [9–11,18].
2. Kerberos 5 basics
The Kerberos protocol [39] was designed to allow a legitimate user to log on to her terminal once a day (typically)
and then transparently access all the networked resources she needed for the rest of that day. Each time she wanted to
retrieve a ﬁle from a remote server, for example, Kerberos would securely handle the required authentication behind
the scene, without any user intervention.
We will now gently review how Kerberos 5 [40], the current version of this protocol, achieves secure authentication
based on a single log on. We ﬁrst introduce the various principals taking part in a Kerberos exchange in Section 2.1.
Then, in Section 2.2,we focus on the simple subprotocol that achieves basic authenticationwithin a single administrative
domain (or realm). In Section 2.3 we extend this description to capture how Kerberos supports authentication across
different realms. We conclude this brief review in Section 2.4 by looking at some of the extended functionalities made
available by the speciﬁcation documents of Kerberos, and present in actual implementations.
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Fig. 1. An overview of Kerberos basic authentication.
2.1. Principals
Kerberos is implemented as a number of software agents, or principals, each handling a different aspect of authen-
tication when a human user at her terminal requests a networked service such as a remote printer. First, the client
process accepts the user’s password and transparently handles the authentication aspect of each of her requests on her
behalf. Dually, the service is mediated by a server process, for example a print server. Kerberos relies on two additional
administrative agents together known as the KDC: the Kerberos authentication server (KAS) who authenticates the
user and provides the corresponding client with credentials to use the network for the day, and the ticket granting server
(TGS) who authenticates the client to each requested server based on those credentials.
The high-level picture is given in Fig. 1. The top of the ﬁgure represents the daily authentication to Kerberos: as
the user (U ) logs on, the KAS authenticates the client process (C) representing her and provides credentials to use the
system for that day. These credentials from the KAS are called the ticket granting ticket, abbreviated TGT. Whenever
the user wants to use a networked service, the client on her behalf will seek authentication to the process S managing
this service. This is done in two steps: the ﬁrst time U attempts to access S, C presents the TGT from the KAS to the
TGS who will in turn provide credentials for S. These credentials are called the service ticket or ST. Every subsequent
time U wants access to this particular service, C forwards the ST to S, without involving the TGS. The line at the
bottom of the ﬁgure represents the actual use of the desired service: this is all the user sees as her client process handles
the authentication overhead.
The above mode of interaction is typical of a single organization, or realm in Kerberos terminology. Each realm is
regulated by a single KDC (although there may be synchronized replicas for performance and fault tolerance reasons).
Within a realm, there are in general multiple clients and multiple servers. Intra-realm authentication, as this modality
is known, has been extensively studied [3,9,35]. Kerberos also supports cross-realm authentication, a scheme by which
a client in a realm R1 can access a service in a different realm Rn; this is part of the basic Kerberos 5 speciﬁcation,
but to our knowledge has not been formally studied outside of this project. We now recall how the basic intra-realm
protocol works and then account for cross-realm capabilities.
2.2. Core authentication exchange
In this section, we focus on the messages exchanged during a typical intra-realm authentication session between
a client C and a server S, as sketched in the boxed part of Fig. 1. For the moment, we will concentrate on the core
authentication tasks, and therefore describe Kerberos 5 in a drastically simpliﬁed form. We will extend this basic
skeleton with a variety of features of the actual protocol [40] in Section 2.4. In the following, we assume the reader
familiar with the traditional concepts pertaining to security protocols, in particular the notions of nonce, shared key
encryption, and timestamps. We write m,m′ for the concatenation of messages m and m′, and {m}k for the encryption
of m with symmetric key k.
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Fig. 2. Core intra-realm message exchange.
The ﬂeshed out version of the Kerberos 5 exchanges is given in Fig. 2: the top part relies on the traditional “Alice-
and-Bob” notation, with the standard name [40] for each message given on the left. The bottom part takes a clearer
two-dimensional view. We will now describe each of the three roundtrips between a client (C) and the KAS (K for
short), the TGS (T for short), and a server (S), respectively.
Authentication service (AS) exchange (C ⇔ K): This exchange takes place when the user ﬁrst logs on to a Kerberized
network. The client process C generates a nonce n1 and sends it to the KAS together with her own name, C, which
indirectly identiﬁes the user, and the name of the TGS (ofﬁcially “krbtgt”, here abbreviated as T ).
Upon recognizing C (and indirectly U ), the KAS replies with a message containing two encrypted components: the
TGT {AK,C, tK}kT that is cached by C and will be used to obtain STs for the rest of the day, and {AK, n1, tK, T }kC
with which the KAS informs C of the parameters of the ticket. The TGT is meant for the TGS and is encrypted with
the long-term key kT that the KAS shares with the TGS. It contains a freshly generated authentication key AK and a
timestamp tK in addition to C’s name (and many other pieces of information, abstracted away for the moment). The
key kC used to encrypt the second component is a long-term secret between C and the KAS derived from the user’s
password.AKwill be used in every subsequent communication with the TGS, reducing the use ofC’s long-term key kC .
(In a typical conﬁguration, kC is password-derived, and thus more vulnerable; at the least, it is more valuable than the
shorter-term key AK.) The timestamp tK will assure the TGS and C that this ticket was issued recently, as all Kerberos
principals have loosely synchronized clocks. The nonce n1 in the second component binds this response to C’s original
request.
Ticket granting (TG) exchange (C ⇔ T): This exchange takes place the ﬁrst time U tries to access a service S. In the
outgoing message, C transmits the cached TGT and S’s name together with a freshly generated nonce n2 (again to bind
this request and the subsequent response), and the authenticator {C, tC}AK , where tC is a timestamp. The authenticator
proves to T that C indeed knows the authentication key AK.
Upon authenticating C and verifying that she is allowed to use S, the TGS sends a response with the same structure
as the second message above except that the ST {SK,C, tT }kS is now encrypted with the long-term key kS shared
between the KDC and S, and it contains a freshly generated service key SK, C’s name, and a timestamp tT . The other
encrypted component is as in the second message above, but now encrypted with the authentication key AK. C caches
the ST.
Client/server exchange (C ⇔ S): This exchange takes place each time the client initiates a new session with the
server S. With a ST in hand, C simply contacts S with this ticket and an authenticator similar to the one described
above.
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Fig. 3. Schematic cross-realm authentication.
The response from S is optional as the subsequent application exchanges may subsume it. When present, it provides
assurance to C that S is alive, for example by returning the timestamp t ′C that C included in her request, encrypted with
the service key.
The actual application exchanges, by which S provides the service requested by C, are not properly part of Kerberos
(whose mandate is limited to authentication). However, Kerberos provides message formats to attain speciﬁed security
goals.
2.3. Cross-Realm support
Kerberos supports authentication across organizational boundaries by permitting clients and servers to reside on
different realms [18,40]. A realm consists a group of clients, a KDC, and application servers, as seen in Section 2.2. For
example, the Graphics group in the Computer Science Department of University A may organize as an independent
realm RGr with its own users, services and administrators. Similarly, the CS department may deﬁne a Kerberos realm
RCS to allow CS members to access common resources, and the university may in turn have a realm RA of its own to
operate university-wide resources such as printers in dormitories. Cross-realm authentication enables a student at her
workstation in the Graphics lab to transparently access a ﬁle on the common CS server, and even to seamlessly print
it on a printer in her dormitory. Without cross-realm authentication this student would need a separate account in each
realm, log into each of them, and explicitly transfer ﬁles from account to account in order to achieve the same goals.
This is impractical, not scalable, and less secure as several passwords would be needed, one for each realm. While this
form of hierarchical organization [7] of realms is recommended when enabling cross-realm authentication in Kerberos,
it is by no means mandated, as, for example, the Graphics realm of universityAmay establish a cross-realm partnership
with the Graphics realm of another university with which it collaborates.
In the simplest case, the cross-realm authentication of a client C in realm R1 to a server S in Rn is accomplished by
having the KDC of R1 register the KDC of Rn as a special server in R1 and using a variant of the intra-realm protocol
to ﬁrst acquire a TGT for C in R1 (as always) and then a ST for Rn’s KDC seen as a local service in R1. This ST has
the same format as a TGT for C in Rn, and as such it is handed to the KDC of Rn to obtain a ST for accessing S. The
key used by R1’s KDC to encrypt the ticket for the special service corresponding to Rn’s KDC is called a cross-realm
key. In Kerberos 5, C’s access to S may require traversing intermediate realms R2, . . . , Rn−1 if there is no cross-realm
key between R1 and Rn, but R1 has such a partnership with R2, R2 with R3, etc. up to Rn. C then needs to obtain a
TGT for each of these realms in succession before accessing S. The list of traversed KDCs [R1, . . . , Rn] is called the
authentication path of C’s access to S. This high-level description is schematically represented in Fig. 3. The top part
of this ﬁgure shows the identiﬁcation of a KDC in one realm with an application server in a neighboring realm. The
bottom part of Fig. 3 gives a very abstract “Alice-and-Bob” description of cross-realm authentication. C ﬁrst obtains a
TGT in her own realm, uses this to iteratively obtain cross-realm tickets, and then ﬁnally obtains a ST for the desired
end server S; the cross-realm tickets are viewed as STs in the realm in which they are granted, and as TGTs in the
neighboring realm (whose KDC, viewed as an end server, granted the ticket).
The message structure discussed in Section 2.2 for intra-realm authentication is to a large extent adequate to support
cross-realm authentication. Indeed, each communication with a new KDC in Fig. 3 corresponds to a TG exchange,
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as described in Fig. 2: the ST returned by each TGS is forwarded to the TGS of the next realm who interprets it as a
TGT. In order to support cross-realm authentication, Kerberos 5 reﬁnes the simpliﬁed message format discussed above
by mandating that tickets contain a ﬁeld known as TRANSITED. This ﬁeld implements the partial authentication path
of C’s request on its way to S: whenever a ticket leaves realm Ri , it lists all the realms [R1, . . . , Ri−1] that have been
previously traversed; Ri itself will be added by the KDC of Ri+1 (in this way, Ri’s KDC cannot hide the fact that Ri
appeared on the authentication path—although the KDC ofRi+1 may). The TRANSITED ﬁeld is empty for intra-realm
authentication. Therefore, the (cross-realm) ST created by the TGS of realm Ri has the following format:
STi = TGTi+1 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩AKi, C, tTi , [R1, . . . , Ri−1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
TRANSITED
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭
kRi ,Ti+1
,
where AKi and tTi are the authentication key and timestamp generated by the TGS Ti of Ri , and kRi,Ti+1 is the cross-
realm key of the TGS Ti+1 of Ri+1 in Ri . The TRANSITED ﬁeld is the only information available to the target KDC of
a cross-realm authentication request to establish whether all previously traversed realms are trustworthy, and therefore
to decide whether to grant access to the requested server. Indeed, although Ti makes a statement of trust when providing
Ti−1 with a cross-realm key, it has no say on the partnerships that Ti−1 forms and indeed may not trust some of these
realms.
In spite of support in Kerberos as part of Windows and in other protocol suites (e.g., [1]), the literature on cross-
realm authentication is scant and surprisingly old. The earliest paper in this arena appears to be [7], which proposes
organizing authentication servers into a hierarchy for efﬁcient authentication across administrative boundaries, a design
still recognizable in Kerberos. More recently, Gligor et al. [27] undertook a general study of interrealm authentication
(as they call it) with particular focus on deﬁning local trust policies that mitigate global security exposure. In particular,
they studied an algorithm for ﬁnding authentication paths that is very close to Kerberos’s own. The original interest in
research in cross-realm authentication seems to have ended in the early 1990’s. While that work was mostly concerned
with designing a solid cross-realm authentication infrastructure, our effort focuses on its formal speciﬁcation and
analysis.
2.4. Real-world features
The protocol we have described so far is a drastic simpliﬁcation of Kerberos 5 as deﬁned in the speciﬁcation docu-
ments [40] and implemented in numerous systems. It does however capture the essence of what Kerberos authentication
is about, and, as such, variants have been the object of formal analysis [3,5,35]. 4 The goal of this project was however
to get much closer to the actual speciﬁcation of this protocol [40]. For this reason, we considered a number of features
available in the actual protocol, but never before formally analyzed. The messages and exchanges examined in our
most detailed work are displayed in Fig. 4, where the grayed out portions identify aspects that we have not discussed
so far. We will now introduce them in some detail.
Options and ﬂags: In the concreteKerberos protocol, the client can ask any principalwithwhomshe is communicating
for some non-default behaviors by setting a number of options in her request. For example, she can ask for a ticket to
be postdated for later use, or forwardable to another principal or renewable upon expiry. The responding server informs
the client of which of these options she has granted by setting corresponding ﬂags in the response (as well as in the
ticket), or by directly implementing this behavior. This mechanism is generically described in Fig. 4 by means of the
components KOpts (options for the KAS), TFlags (ﬂags from the KAS, appearing in the ticket for the TGS), TOpts
(options for the TGS), SFlags (ﬂags from the TGS, for the end server) and SOpt (options for the end server). Of the
dozen or so ﬂags/options supported by Kerberos, we have examined two:
• MUTUAL-REQUIRED: with this SOpt option, the client requests that the end-server responds with the otherwise
optional sixth message of Kerberos (shown as KRB_AP_REP in Fig. 2).
• ANONYMOUS: this option [38] is used to allow asking the TGS not to include the client’s name when constructing
a ST but the generic string “USER”. This option was removed from recent speciﬁcations of Kerberos, but it has just
come again under consideration as a possible extension to the basic protocol [46].
4 Some of this work, namely [3,5], examined Kerberos 4 [39], which has been gradually superseded in practice by Kerberos 5.
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Fig. 4. Examined Features of the Kerberos 5 Speciﬁcation.
Error messages: Error messages are almost invariably ignored in academic abstractions of real-world protocols.
They however play an important role throughout the lifetime of a protocol: they are useful debugging tools during
development and conﬁguration, they can be tell-tale signs of attempted intrusion or other network problem, they also
support the more mundane task of informing a principal that the combination of optional behaviors she has requested
are unavailable so that she may try the request again with different parameters. In Kerberos, error messages can be
issued only in response to a client request, as described in Fig. 4. They have the form
tM, terr, ErrCode, C, P,
where C is the client, P is the issuing server, tM is a timestamp copied from the request that caused the error, terr is a
timestamp generated by P , and ErrCode is one of a large number of error codes meant to identify what went wrong.
Note that error messages are never encrypted.
Encryption types: As often done in protocol veriﬁcation, we have represented the encryption of a term m with a
key k as {m}k . In the real world, this is achieved by using some encryption algorithm. In contrast to earlier versions,
Kerberos 5 supports multiple ciphers—it is indeed extensible as new ciphers can be accommodated if they satisfy some
basic criteria [41]. Because various principals may implement different encryption algorithms, Kerberos provides some
support for cipher negotiation. When requesting a ticket, the client can indeed ask for a particular encryption method
to be used by including an encryption type, written e in Fig. 4. If the KAS or TGS supports this cipher, it will use it
in the reply: we express the fact that m is encrypted with key k using the algorithm identiﬁed by e as {m}ek , but omit e
when unimportant or easily inferable from the context. If this server does not know about this cipher, it will return an
error message which may lead the client to retry the request with a different encryption type.
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Message digests: The Kerberos speciﬁcation [40] allows the KAS and TGS to return a keyed message digest to the
client in order to ensure the integrity of the response. They are indicated as MD and MD′ in Fig. 4. Note that while
MD has a ﬁxed format, the contents of MD′ depends on the particular service the client has requested. We use [m]k
for the message digest of m, keyed with k. We do not assume that this operation obscures m, but we do assume that
[m]k can only be constructed by a principal who knows both m and k.
While our analysis took these features of the concrete speciﬁcation of Kerberos 5 into account, time and resource
limitations kept us from examining other aspects of this protocol. In particular, we did not exhaustively scrutinize
all the supported ﬂags and options. We similarly left aside the optional pre-authentication phase, by which the KAS
expects the client to partially encrypt the initial request. We ignored all temporal information unless it played a role
in the authentication process: this includes ticket validity and expiration dates, for example. We did not consider the
support for subkeys, by which client can specify the key with which she would like to communicate with an end server.
Although the client and server applications are ultimately responsible for the messages exchanged after authentication
has gone through, Kerberos provides a few message formats that ensure properties such as integrity and conﬁdentiality:
we did not attempt to model them. Finally, we did not consider the various auxiliary protocols of the Kerberos suite,
which allow for example a user to changes her password with the KDC (and therefore the key kC that the corresponding
client extracts from it) or to propagate changes to replicas of the KDC. It should be emphasized that none of these
omissions is due to limitations in our methodology, but only to the time and other resources we had available.
3. Results
Our analysis ofKerberos 5has produced formal proofs that the protocol has a number of desirable (positive) properties,
as well as some examples of protocol behavior which does not violate these properties but which is nonetheless
curious. Among our positive results, the primary one—because Kerberos is an authentication protocol—is that the
client and server are authenticated to each other under natural assumptions; we state these as data origin authentication
properties [28] (e.g., if a message appears on the network in some state of a trace, then earlier in the trace a speciﬁed
principal put that message on the network). Our results also include conﬁdentiality and structural soundness (i.e., that
a later round cannot take place unless the exchanges that precede it have occurred) properties for Kerberos 5. These are
important in their own right, especially as some of the session keys may be used in future communications between
protocol participants.
In order to show these properties for our formalization (in the MSR language), we needed to develop new proof
techniques.We inductively deﬁned two classes of functions thatwe then used to carry out a pair of intertwined inductions
(arising from the interplay between secrecy and authentication); these functions were initially deﬁned in [9] and used
in our other work, but here we give a more complete perspective on their use. We outline the positive properties we
obtained in Section 3.1, and discuss the techniques we used to prove them in Section 3.2.
While the positive properties we have proved provide minimum guarantees for Kerberos, the curious behaviors—
“anomalies”—described in Section 3.3 illustrate ways in which these guarantees cannot be extended. It is important to
note both that these anomalies do not violate authentication and conﬁdentiality of Kerberos and that it may be unwise
to assume the protocol provides more than it claims.
Our positive results hold in the presence of a Dolev–Yao intruder, and we assume the powers of such an intruder in
exhibiting the anomalies. This intruder has complete control of the network and may intercept messages, decompose
them (in particular perform decryption if she knows the relevant key), copy messages, create new messages, and send
her own messages to other protocol participants. Note that we do not intentionally leak keys to the intruder as was done
in [3–5]. An MSR speciﬁcation of the intruder can be found in Section 4.2, with additional details in [9,11].
Finally, we state most of our results using a fairly abstract view of Kerberos. In a related technical report [11] we
give three formalizations of Kerberos, one which essentially corresponds to the presentation here and two that reﬁne
it in different ways. We also gave formal proofs at both an abstract and a detailed level for some of the properties we
discuss here; it is notable that the properties and proofs for our more detailed formalization can be obtained by adding
detail to the statements of properties and proofs for our abstract formalization. While we restrict our discussion to an
abstract view of Kerberos, here we state our properties in the context of cross-realm Kerberos while [11] covered only
intra-realmKerberos. This extends the work in [18], which proved Property 8 but did not treat intra-realm authentication
and conﬁdentiality properties within the formalization that covered intra- and cross-realm Kerberos.
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3.1. Secrecy, authentication, and structural soundness
We begin with the positive properties that we have proved about Kerberos 5. As Kerberos is intended to provide
authentication, it is important that we are able to prove that the client is authenticated to the TGS and application servers
involved in a protocol run. We are also able to prove that the KAS, TGS, and server are authenticated to the client. We
also prove secrecy, which is important for two reasons: ﬁrst, it guarantees that the client and server share a fresh secret
key, which may be used in later communication that we do not model here; secondly, secrecy properties are needed to
prove authentication (the reverse is also true). Finally, we prove “structural soundness” of the protocol—i.e., that if a
protocol exchange takes place, then the various earlier protocol exchanges took place and did so in the expected order.
As just alluded to, the properties that we prove are interdependent. In the basic intra-realm case, authentication
of the client to the TGS depends on the secrecy of the session keys generated by the KAS, and her authentication
to a server depends on the secrecy of the session keys generated by TGS. We state these authentication properties
informally as Properties 4, 5, and 7, and the secrecy properties as Properties 2, 3, and 6. The secrecy of session keys
generated by the KAS depends on the secrecy of long-term keys, which we assume (these are set up out-of-band
and are never sent as network messages). However, the secrecy of session keys generated by the TGS depends on
authenticating the source of the key AK that the TGS shares with the client (which the TGS uses to encrypt the freshly
generated key).
We may also authenticate the sources of some of the data that the client receives; one example of this is in Property
1, and others follow from the conﬁdentiality properties that we show. Property 8 shows that the ticket presented to an
application server contains accurate information about the realms involved in the authentication of the client to the
server. Finally, Property 9 gives a structural soundness property of Kerberos; this covers the entire protocol, but we
may also prove similar guarantees that hold after initial segments of a protocol run.
In this section we present the English-language statements of the properties that we have proved for Kerberos 5.
Some of these are stated more formally, in terms of our MSR formalization, in Section 4.4; the correspondence between
the properties here and the theorems there is noted below. A more complete list of properties, the lemmas they depend
on and their proofs can be found in [11].
Finally, it is important to note that the ticket-authentication properties implicitly assume that the tickets being
authenticateddid not exist at the beginningof the protocol run. (This is reasonable, as there are no expected circumstances
inwhich the networkwould start in a state containing a ticket.) This assumption is explicitly noted in the formal theorems
in Section 4.4.
3.1.1. AS exchange
We start with the authentication of the KAS to the client in the AS exchange; Property 1 is more formally stated as
Theorem 3 in Section 4.4.
Property 1 (Authentication of KAS to client). If the client sees what appears to be a valid reply from the KAS and if
her long-term key is secret, then the KAS in her realm generated a reply to a request that named the client.
Note that the client is not authenticated to the KAS in this exchange because the client’s request is sent in the clear.
However, as is shown below, if the client is able to create an authenticator that matches the ticket generated by the KAS
then the client can be authenticated to the TGS.
3.1.2. TG exchange
As the TG exchange is closer to the beginning of a protocol run than is the CS exchange, the properties in this section
are simpler than the ones in the next section.
Because the communications between the client and TGS use the shared key AK generated by the KAS which
created the TGT, we want to ensure that AK remains conﬁdential. In this exchange, the TGS produces credentials
(a ST) in response to a request which contains a TGT and an authenticator. We thus also wish to authenticate the origin
of these objects; in the case of the authenticator, which is encrypted using the key AK shared between C and T , we
make use of the conﬁdentiality result for this exchange. Finally, we wish to guarantee that if this round of the protocol
takes place, then a corresponding AS exchange previously took place.
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Property 2 covers the conﬁdentiality of the intra-realm keys generated in the AS exchange and used in the TG
exchange; this is formally stated as Theorem 4 in Section 4.4.
Property 2 (Conﬁdentiality of intra-realm AK). If the intruder does not know the long-term secret keys (kC and kT )
used to encrypt the intra-realm session key AK generated by the authentication server K for use by C and T , then the
intruder cannot learn AK .
Property 3 covers the conﬁdentiality of the cross-realm keys generated in the TGS exchange for use in other TGS
exchanges; this is formally stated as Theorem 5 in Section 4.4.
Property 3 (Conﬁdentiality of cross-realm AK). If the intruder does not know the cross-realm key kT,T ′ or the key
AK , each used by T to encrypt the cross-realm session key AK ′ for use by C and T ′, then the intruder cannot learn
AK ′.
Property 4 shows that we may authenticate the origin of the ticket and authenticator used to request a ST. This is
similar to an authentication theorem for purely intra-realm Kerberos, although in this case the TGT on which the ST
is based may be either intra- or cross-realm.
Property 4 (Authentication of request for ST). If a TGS processes a request for a service ticket and if neither the long-
term key encrypting the ticket nor any key shared between the client and the KAS/TGS which apparently produced the
ticket is known to the intruder, then the ticket in the request is a valid intra- or cross-realm ticket and was generated by
a KAS or TGS with whom the TGS shares a long-term key. Furthermore, the authenticator included in the request was
generated by the client named in the ticket.
Finally, Property 5 shows that we may authenticate the origin of the ticket and authenticator in a request for a
cross-realm ticket; this is formally stated as Theorem 6 in Section 4.4.
Property 5 (Authentication of request for TGT). If a TGS processes a request for a cross-realm ticket and if neither the
key encrypting the ticket nor any key shared between the client and the KAS/TGS which apparently produced the ticket
is known to the intruder, then the ticket in the request is a valid cross-realm ticket and was generated by a KAS/TGS
with whom the TGS shares a long-term key. Furthermore, the authenticator included in the request was generated by
the client named in the ticket.
3.1.3. Client/server (CS) exchange
We now move to properties of the CS exchange; as this exchange parallels the TG Exchange, its properties parallel
the properties we have proved for that exchange. These properties are built on those stated above and may be viewed
as our main positive results.
The ﬁrst property for the CS exchange gives conditions under which the session key shared by the client and server
is not known to the intruder. This parallels [3, Theorem 6.19] for Kerberos 4.
Property 6 (Conﬁdentiality of SK). If the intruder knows neither the long-term secret key kRT ,S used by a TGS to
encrypt the ST containing a new session key SK for a client to use with a server nor the session key used by the client
to request the ST, then the intruder cannot learn SK .
The second property for the CS exchange is our main result for this exchange and captures authentication of
the client C to the server S, again in the form of data origin authentication. It states conditions which guaran-
tee that if S receives a certain message (consisting of a ST and an authenticator), apparently sent by C, then the
ST originated with some TGS T and the authenticator originated with C. The assumptions needed for the theo-
rem to hold are that the ticket did not already exist at the beginning of the trace, and that the intruder I does not
have access to the long-term key of the server S or the key shared between C and the TGS T who generated the
ticket.
68 F. Butler et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 367 (2006) 57–87
Property 7 (Authentication of request to server). If the intruder does not know the long term key used to encrypt a ST
for a clientC to present to a server S then if S processes a request, ostensibly fromC, containing this ST and the session
key SK , then some TGS generated the session key SK for C to use with S and also created the ST. Furthermore, if the
intruder never learns the session key which the TGS used to encrypt SK when sending the ST to C, then C created the
authenticator.
Kerberos’s only defense against compromised or untrusted intermediate realms is the use of the TRANSITED ﬁeld
to enable a server to determine if authentication should be performed. The following property proves that if there
are any compromised realms involved in the authentication of a client then at least one of them will appear in the
TRANSITED ﬁeld. This is a critical property because it allows servers to make informed authentication decisions. In
addition, this property shows that under expected network conditions (i.e., when there are no compromised TGSs) the
TRANSITED ﬁeld of a ST contains exactly the realms involved in authenticating the client. While not following from
this property, we expect that under the assumptions that the client’s long-term key has not been compromised and the
set of transited realms contains only non-compromised realms, then the client named in the message did in fact request
this authentication.
Property 8 (Correctness of transited realm data). If a server S processes a request from a client C and if R is the set
of realms encoded by the TRANSITED ﬁeld of the request, together with the realm of the TGS that created the ticket
in the request and C’s realm, and if neither keys between realms in R nor S’s long-term key have been compromised,
then some sequence of TGSes from realms inR, starting with the TGS in C’s realm, authenticated C to S and the TGS
of each realm in R took part in this authentication.
3.1.4. Structural soundness of Kerberos 5
We close our report on the positive results with a property about the structural soundness of Kerberos 5, i.e., that if
the ﬁnal exchange happens then the ﬁrst two exchanges also happened and did so in the expected order. Because of the
complexity of this property, we omit its formal statement and proof.
Property 9 (Structural soundness). If an application server S processes a request for service from a client C, and if
the long-term keys for C, the KASs in her realm, and between the realms listed in the ST presented to S are all secret,
then C requested a TGT from the KAS in her realm and then later obtained an ST for S. If C and S are in the same
realm, this ST was based directly on the TGT, while if C and S are in different realms then C used the TGT to obtain
a sequence of TGTs, the last of which was used to obtain the ST for S.
3.2. Innovation
Results such as the ones informally reported in the previous section are routinely assessed of the protocol abstractions
typically examined in the formal veriﬁcation literature. Many of the methods in use would however be overwhelmed
by the size and complexity of a real-world protocol speciﬁcation. These considerations led to the design a streamlined
methodology that proved robust enough to allow us to manually construct formal proofs for all the above results,
a sample of which is reported in Section 4.4. We will now present an overview of the main aspects of this methodology,
with selected details describedmore thoroughly in Section 4. The complete set of properties and their proofs can be found
in other publications related to this project, such as [9–11,18]. Section 3.2.1 presents the case for the use of the language
MSR as the basis of our formalization. Section 3.2.2 discusses the structure of our proofs and the mathematical tools
that support it. Section 3.2.3 describes the use of reﬁnement to incrementally produce a formalization and associated
results for detailed speciﬁcations.
3.2.1. Formalization language
A ﬁrst task in the veriﬁcation process consisted in translating the hefty IETF speciﬁcation documents of Kerberos
5 [40] into a form more conductive to formal veriﬁcation than English text. The inherent complexity of the Kerberos
speciﬁcation, typical of most real-world protocols, required a formalization language that was not only unambiguous,
but also provided the ﬂexibility to selectively abstract auxiliary protocol elements as well as to annotate formalized
objects with important semantic information. We settled on the language MSR [13,18,25], although it had previously
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been used only on very simple protocols. This proved to be a valid choice as the linguistic features it provided not only
permitted an easy formalization of the Kerberos speciﬁcation, but also integrated quite well in our overall veriﬁcation
methodology. It should be noted however that although we expressed the protocol in MSR, our proof techniques are not
bound to this formalism and can easily be ported to many other languages, provided they are sufﬁciently expressive.
By the same token, MSR is a speciﬁcation language, and is methodology-independent.
MSR is a ﬂexible framework for specifying distributed systems, in particular cryptographic protocols. It uses strongly
typed multiset rewriting rules over ﬁrst-order atomic formulas to express protocol actions and relies on a form of
existential quantiﬁcation to symbolically model the generation of nonces and other fresh data. Dependent types and
subsorting provide powerfulmeans to incorporate semantic annotations in a speciﬁcation. Because it is based onmultiset
rewriting,MSRspeciﬁcations are executable and a prototype implementation has recently been developed [20], although
most of the Kerberos project predates it. MSR is also closely related to linear logic.
The mentioned prototype [20] is built on top of the Maude rewriting system [23,34]. It currently provides a simple
environment that assists a user in the process of writing and debugging an MSR speciﬁcation. It implements a full type
checker for MSR, which allows verifying the syntactic correctness of a speciﬁcation and therefore to gain conﬁdence
in it. Type reconstruction signiﬁcantly simpliﬁes writing MSR rules as the system automatically ﬁlls in the majority
of typing information present in a rule. Finally, this prototype supports the controlled execution of rules, which falls
short of model checking as no termination guarantee is provided. The MSR prototype was developed after most of
the work discussed in this paper had been carried out (manually). In fact, parts of this work were used to debug the
implementation. In the future, we will use this prototype as our prime tool to develop MSR speciﬁcations. Furthermore,
we plan to have the prototype more closely cooperate with the numerous tools that have been developed on top of
Maude over the years. Of particular interest are an interactive theorem prover, which we could automate aspects of
our technique, but also several model checkers that could perform state exploration on the basis of an appropriately
transformed MSR speciﬁcation. These developments are however left for future work.
3.2.2. Proof methodology
Our approach to protocol veriﬁcation lies in the general area of theorem proving, and in this respect it is reminiscent
of Paulson’s inductive method [4,5]. It relies on MSR for providing a precise speciﬁcation of both the protocol and the
attacker’s capabilities in the form of a ﬁnite and ﬁxed set of state transition rules (see Section 4 for details). Given an
initial state, these rules implicitly deﬁne all the possible traces that are anchored at this state. Our theorems have one
of two forms: (1) given certain conditions on the initial state, all reachable states are subject to a given invariant (this
is the form of a typical conﬁdentiality result); (2) given certain conditions on the initial state, if a reachable state in any
trace has a given characteristic, then some speciﬁc event must have occurred earlier on that trace that caused it (this
conditional form is typical of authentication results). The proofs of these results are inductive in the length of a trace
and use two functions, rank and corank, to guide the induction. Each case of the induction corresponds to a protocol
or attacker rule. We will now give a general overview of the way these functions are used, leaving a more detailed
discussion to Section 4.3.
Both types of functions are deﬁned inductively on terms and predicates in the MSR formalization of a protocol, but
they may be easily deﬁned for use in other formalisms. Our rank functions capture the amount of cryptographic work
done, using a key k, starting with a speciﬁed message m0 (this is the k-rank relative to m0). We use rank functions to
prove our authentication results (although these often assume conﬁdentiality results proved with corank functions). In
general, we assume that no predicate (MSR fact) of positive k-rank relative to m0 was present at the start of a trace;
if such a fact appears later in the trace, then some action must have increased the value of this function. The intruder
cannot increase k-rank without knowing the key k. Thus, if we can prove that k is secret, then we know that the term
{m0}k was produced by some honest principal. If there is a unique honest principal who could have produced this fact,
then we have authenticated the origin of this datum.
Corank functions capture the minimum amount of cryptographic work that must be done, using keys from a set E, to
extract a speciﬁed message m0 from some other message (this is the E-corank relative tom0). We use corank functions
to prove our conﬁdentiality results, although these may depend on authentication results and rank functions. The MSR
fact corresponding to the intruder’s knowledge of m0 has E-corank equal to 0 relative to m0 for every set E of keys.
Thus, to prove the secrecy of m0, we just need to ﬁnd some set E of keys such that no fact in the trace has E-corank 0
relative to m0. Assuming no such fact was present at the start of a trace, we simply need to show that no possible action
will decrease this corank to 0. The intruder cannot decrease E-corank without knowing at least one of the keys in E;
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if all of these keys are secret, then conﬁdentiality becomes a matter of considering the actions of honest principals and
their effects on E-corank relative to m0.
As noted above, authentication of a message constructed using a key k may depend on the conﬁdentiality of k. It is
perhaps less obvious that conﬁdentiality may depend on authentication as well. This arises when a freshly generated
key is encrypted using another key that has also been generated during the protocol run—if the encrypting key is not
known to originate with a trusted participant, then the encrypted key need not be secret (as was discussed for Kerberos in
Section 3.1). Thus, inductive arguments using rank and corank functions become intertwined in the course of analyzing
a complex protocol such as Kerberos.
As suggested by their names, our rank and corank functions are inspired in part by Schneider’s work in CSP [42];
related ideas have been discussed in the context of strand spaces [44]. However, the CSP and MSR (co)rank functions
are less alike than their names suggest. In CSP, rank functions are used to partition messages into those which an
intruder might know and those which the intruder cannot know [29]; the question then becomes whether or not a
suitable (CSP) rank function exists. In contrast, our rank and corank functions are deﬁned inductively on (MSR)
terms regardless of whether secrecy or authentication properties hold. Given a desired authentication or conﬁdentiality
property, it is straightforward to determine which (co)rank function is of immediate interest; the necessary work is then
the determination of conditions that guarantee that this corank is never 0 (for conﬁdentiality) or that only a speciﬁed
principal could increase this rank (for authentication).
We may also draw connections between rank and corank functions and natural deduction-style message derivation
(e.g., as in [22]). In this view, k-rank relative to m0 captures the maximum number of encryption rules (using the key k)
that appear on a branch of a normalized derivation tree above a message m and below a use of k to encrypt exactly
the message m0. Similarly, E-corank relative to m0 captures the minimum possible number of decryption rules (using
keys from E) below a message m and above an instance of m0 in a derivation tree. Because of the inductive deﬁnition
of terms in MSR, rank and corank functions are the natural measures to use for our work here.
The veriﬁcation of any security protocol based on symmetric and/or asymmetric cryptography can be decomposed
into alternating conﬁdentiality and authentication analysis phases [19], the most interesting cases being key distribution
protocols such as Kerberos, since their purpose is to transmit newly created keys to requesting parties over suppos-
edly secure channels. Therefore, for all of these protocols, the notions of rank and corank are relevant and can be
advantageously used in the proofs of authentication and conﬁdentiality, respectively. As we will see in Section 4.3,
protocol-speciﬁc deﬁnitions of rank functions can be derived automatically, while some aspects of the deﬁnition of the
corresponding corank function still needs manual intervention.
3.2.3. Proof reﬁnement
Even when using rank and corank functions, the direct construction of a proof at the level of detail considered in
this paper is a substantial and error-prone task. Since the start of this project, we relied on the concept of reﬁnement to
make it more manageable [9].
We wrote an initial MSR speciﬁcation of Kerberos at a very high level of abstraction, akin to the description
presented in Section 2.2. It contained just enough elements to support basic authentication. Lacking the complexity of
our detailed target, we could state its security properties and derive proofs for them with relative ease. We then reﬁned
this formalization to support additional features, which were propagated to the statements of properties and woven into
their proofs. In particular, the more abstract proofs provided the structure of the more concrete proof, which allowed
us to focus on integrating the additions in the proof.
Space considerations prevent us from demonstrating this technique in this paper. The interested reader is referred
to [9,11] where several reﬁnements are used.
We have not attempted to automate the process of proof reﬁnement just discussed, but other authors have taken steps
in this direction. Reﬁnement is indeed a basic construct of the derivation methods based on CSP [42]. Closer to our
setting, the protocol derivation framework of Pavlovic et al. embeds sophisticated rules to maintain provability through
reﬁnement [19,33].
3.3. Anomalies
In this section we describe some anomalous protocol behaviors that we have noted as we were analyzing Kerberos 5.
These anomalies do not appear to pose any fundamental threat to the security of the protocol—the positive properties
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discussed in Section 3.1 indeed prove that Kerberos provides the expected strong conﬁdentiality and authentication
assurance—so the behaviors described in this sectionmaybe viewed as ‘interesting curiosities.’Manyof these anomalies
were discovered when attempting to translate known theorems about Kerberos 4 [3,5] into results for Kerberos 5:
anytime a proof broke down, an anomaly emerged. A detailed description of this process can be found in [11]. Some
authors have devised methods to automatically propagate attacks and other anomalous behaviors through reﬁnement
[33].
The primary structural difference between versions 4 and 5 of Kerberos is the manner the KAS and the TGS transmit
tickets. In Kerberos 4, the client receives tickets as part of the data encrypted under either her long-term key (tC) or a
session key (AK). We saw that version 5 sends the tickets as a separate component without additional encryption. An
intruder can exploit this message structure to tamper with the unprotected ticket in various ways (although she seems
unable to cause serious damage by doing so). This structural difference between versions 4 and 5 is the root cause of
most of the anomalies we note below.
3.3.1. Ticket anomaly
In our ﬁrst scenario, C sends her request message as usual, but the intruder I intercepts the reply from K . I replaces
the ticket with a generic bitstring X (C does not expect to be able to read the ticket because it is encrypted) and stores
the ticket in her memory. When C tries to send a request message to T (using the meaningless X instead of the ticket),
I intercepts this message and replaces X with the original ticket from K and forwards the result (a well-formed request
for a TGT) to T . A similar demeanor can take place when asking the TGT for a ST.
These anomalies do not appear to compromise any keys used in the protocol, but they are notable because they
are counterexamples to the direct translation of properties established for Kerberos 4 [3, Theorems 6.22 and 6.23].
These anomalies are not prevented by the message digests MD and MD′ introduced in Section 2, because they do
not cover the tickets. It appears that these anomalies could be prevented if the digests were modiﬁed to also cover
the ticket.
3.3.2. Anonymous ticket switch anomaly
Another anomaly involving tampering with tickets makes use of the ANONYMOUS ticket option. This scenario,
schematically reported in Fig. 5, begins with a normal AS exchange. Afterward we suppose C desires two tickets
from T for a given server S, one regular ticket and the other anonymous. T responds with the regular service ticket
STC containing key AKC , and the anonymous service ticket STUSER containing the key AKUSER (along with the
appropriate other components of these messages). I intercepts these messages and switches the tickets, causing C to
have incorrect beliefs about which (opaque) ticket contains her identity. When C sends requests using these tickets,
both requests will be rejected by S (since the tickets do not match the service keys) unless I intervenes. I then replaces
the authenticator encrypted with SKUSER with the authenticator encrypted with SKC . The server can open the ticket
in each of these messages, but only the key in the regular service ticket STC will open the accompanying authenticator.
An error message is sent by S, in which I can replace the generic name USER with C’s name (since error messages
are sent unencrypted). C may then believe that her anonymous request was accepted and her regular request rejected,
when in fact the opposite is true.
This anomaly, a speciﬁc instance of the ticket anomaly above, seems to be avoided if the message digest in the
KRB_AP_REQ messages are taken over the ST (so that the server S would be aware of any ticket switches).
After completing our initial work [9] on Kerberos, we brought the anomalies discussed here to the attention of the
IETF Kerberos working group. At that time the protocol draft no longer speciﬁed anonymous tickets, but it was thought
that they might be included again at a later date [37]. This possibility is now under consideration in the IETF working
group [46], with whom we are actively collaborating on this issue [30,31].
While the use of the ANONYMOUS ticket option has historical signiﬁcance, this anomaly can be enacted relative to
most options that can appear in a ticket. The intruder can also rearrange the KRB_AP_REQ as to cause the end-server
to issue a replay error message, which can be manipulated at will. This is the substance of the replay anomaly observed
in [11].
3.3.3. Encryption type anomaly
Assume that the client’s long-term key kC associated with a particular encryption type e has been compromised.
While the loss of a long-term key is quite serious, this example illustrates that this prospect is especially difﬁcult to
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Fig. 5. Message ﬂow in the anonymous ticket switch anomaly.
recover from in Kerberos 5. If C realizes the key associated to encryption type e has been compromised, she can send
a KRB_AS_REQ message to K specifying a different encryption method (e′ with key k′C). Since this request is sent in
the clear, I can modify it to force a response using the compromised kC . I may then intercept and use the credentials
from K’s response.
This anomaly cannot be ﬁxed by introducing a message digest, keyed with C’s long-term key in the KRB_AS_REQ
message. Indeed, I could compute [C, T , n, e]ekC using the compromised key kC (since the hash is public), making the
modiﬁed request C, T , n, e, [C, T , n, e]ekC appear legitimate to K .
3.4. Cross-realm trust
In the intra-realm setting, the main objective of formal veriﬁcation is to ascertain that Kerberos realizes stated
conﬁdentiality and authentication goals. An unavoidable assumption is that the administrative principals of that realm
(the KDC) behave honestly: a dishonest or compromised KDC trivially invalidates any authentication or conﬁdentiality
expectations. In the cross-realm case, amultitude of intermediateKDCsmay be involved in the process of authenticating
a client to a remote server, and it can no longer be assumed that every KDC will behave honestly. When conﬁguring
Kerberos for cross-realm operation, a system administrator must consider what will happen if a remote realm is
compromised. What are the security implications associated with a compromised remote KDC, and how can that KDC
affect clients and servers in the rest of theKerberizednetwork?These questions are especially important because the local
system administrator has no control over other realms, cannot ensure that proper and timely maintenance is performed,
and does not have a say on which realms are added to the foreign realm’s trusted list. The Kerberos speciﬁcation
documents [40] do not provide any guarantees about authentication, conﬁdentiality, or any security properties in the
case that intermediate realms are compromised. In fact, the default setting of all distributions is not to trust any foreign
entity and each candidate foreign principal must be explicitly allowed by the system administrator.
Our analysis of cross-realm authentication [18] has established some basic properties for Kerberos 5 (see Section
3.1). It also exposed several serious failures of authentication and conﬁdentiality in the presence of compromised
intermediate realms. In spite of the disclaimer in [40], this is important from a practical point of view as it enables an
administrator to make informed decision about the consequence of supporting cross-realm authentication.
3.4.1. TGSes learn AK and SK
During cross-realm authentication all of the TGSes on the authentication path are capable of learning SK (i.e., the
key shared between the server and the client). In addition, each TGS is capable of learning all of the temporary keys
shared between the client and the other TGSes from that point on in the authentication path. For any TGS Ti along
the authentication path, Ti generates a new key AKi that is used to encrypt communication with the next TGS Ti+1.
Since Ti generates AKi it knows it and can store it in memory. The exchange of a new key AKi+1 between Ti+1 and
C is encrypted with AKi , so Ti can learn AKi+1. Ti can repeat this process for all of the TGSes on the rest of the
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authentication path and is thus capable of learning SK . This means that all of the TGSes on the authentication path
can learn SK and thus use it to spoof the identify of S or C or to eavesdrop on the communication between S and C.
Whether this is a security threat depends on whether all of the TGSes on the authentication path can be trusted. Note
that in the intra-realm case the same behavior described above occurs, however the authentication path consists of just
one TGS.
3.4.2. Remote TGS can impersonate C
Any rogue TGS can impersonate a client C anywhere outside of C’s realm, even if C has never contacted this TGS.
This dishonest TGS TI can make up a ticket for a “next hop” and spoof C’s sending a request using this ticket. C does
not need to be involved, and not even to exist if the end-server does not know C in the ﬁrst place. Note that the rogue
TGS is capable of fabricating the TRANSITED ﬁeld, however Property 8 still holds. The compromised TGS is not able
to masquerade as C in C’s realm because local authentications are not supposed to use the cross-realm mechanism.
3.4.3. Routing vulnerability
With no intruder present, a client is capable of determining the authentication path by keeping track of the TGSes
that she uses. When a client C receives a message of the form C, {AKi, C, tTi , [R1, . . . , Ri−1]}kRi ,Ti+1 {AKi, ni+1, tTi ,
Ti+1}AKi−1 from a TGS Ti (see Section 2.3), the client believes that the next TGS on the authentication path is Ti+1.
However, if there is an intruder TGS on the authentication path then this ﬁeld may be fabricated and the client will
be tricked into believing she is following a false authentication path. Section 3.4.1 describes how every TGS on the
authentication path is capable of learning SK , and in the process learning all of the session keys from that point on in the
authentication path. The intruder can use the appropriate key to change the name of the TGS listed in the portion of the
message encrypted with AKi−1. Thus, if there is an intruder TGS TI , then ∀iI , Ti may not be on the authentication
path. Note that an intruder TGS can trick C into thinking that it is not on the authentication path and is capable of
manipulating the rest of the authentication path in any way it wants without C’s knowledge.
4. Methodology
We start with a brief review of the MSR speciﬁcation language, which we have used to formalize the Kerberos
protocol, and then discuss parts of one of our formalizations of Kerberos. Here we present a formalization that extends
a previous abstract speciﬁcation to allow for cross-realm authentication. As discussed above, we have studied even
more detailed formalizations in [11], which focuses on intra-realm authentication, and which treats messages at the
level of detail discussed in connection with the anonymous ticket switch anomaly given in Section 3.3.2. Because
the more detailed formalization is quite complex, although structurally similar—it adds error messages, but the usual
message ﬂow does not change—we omit it here but refer the interested reader to [11].
We continue in Section 4.2 with a brief discussion of the attacker model on which this work is based. In particular,
we give excerpts of the detailed MSR formalization of the Dolev–Yao intruder as used in the proofs of our results.
We then present a formal deﬁnition of our rank and corank functions in Section 4.3. We conclude with some sample
theorems—the statements using MSR of some properties from Section 3.1—and proofs from our positive results. These
are stated at a level of detail corresponding to the formalization reviewed in Section 4.1; however, one of the notable
results of [11] is that we proved the same English-language properties for our more detailed formalization by adding
more detail to the corresponding theorems and proofs. (I.e., for a given property and its corresponding theorem/proof
in our abstract formalization, we could give a corresponding theorem/proof in our detailed formalization simply by
adding details to the abstract theorem/proof.) The theorems and proofs presented here have not previously appeared;
they parallel results at multiple levels of detail for purely intra-realm authentication [11], but our preliminary report on
cross-realm authentication [18] focused on a different property, summarized here as Property 8.
While it would be straightforward to give additional detail for any single one of these sections, we prefer to use
the same level of detail for each of them; giving the additional detail in all of Sections 4.1–4.4 would make this part
of the paper unwieldy. The additional detail is presented in [11]. Finally, note that some of the symbols used in the
formalization for timestamps, etc., differ from those used in the protocol overview in Section 2; this does not affect the
formalization or results.
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4.1. MSR
MSR [13,18,25] is a ﬂexible framework for specifying complex cryptographic protocols, including those structured
as a collection of coordinated subprotocols. We use MSR 2.0 [13] for our formalization of Kerberos. This version
of MSR uses strongly typed multiset rewriting rules over ﬁrst-order atomic formulas to express protocol actions and
relies on a form of existential quantiﬁcation to symbolically model the generation of fresh data (e.g., nonces or short-
term keys); this includes dependent types, discussed below. A recently completed MSR prototype [20] supporting
type reconstruction, proof checking, and controlled execution will assist in the development of future speciﬁcations.
We plan to integrate it with existing theorem proving tools to automate aspects of our methodology.
4.1.1. Terms and types
MSR represents network messages and their components as ﬁrst-order terms. Thus, the TGT sent from K to C
is modeled as the term obtained by applying the binary encryption symbol {_}
_
to the constant kT and the subterm
(AK,C, tK, certPath). This subterm is built using atomic terms and three applications of the binary concatenation
symbol (“_,_”). Terms are classiﬁed by types, which describe their intended meaning and restrict the set of terms that
can be legally constructed. For example, {_}
_
accepts a key (type key) and a message (type msg), producing a msg;
using a nonce as the key yields an ill-formed message. These objects are declared as
msg : type.
key : type.
{_}
_
: key → msg → msg.
Nonces, principals, etc., often appear within messages. MSR handles this by relying on the notion of subsorting (written
<:). The following declarations deﬁne the type of nonces (nonce) and the fact that every nonce can be used where a
message is expected:
nonce : type. nonce <: msg.
While simple types such asmsg adequately describe simple categories,MSR providesmeans to capture more structured
information [13]. For example, it can express the fact that a client c3 belongs to realm R6 directly within c3’s type. This
is achieved through the notion of dependent type, used as follows in deﬁning the type of principals:
principal : realm → type,
where realm is the type of realms. This has the effect of parameterizing the type of principals by a particular realm.
Thus, if R6 is declared as a realm (by means of the assertion R6 : realm), then the type of c3 above is principal R6
(declared as c3 : principal R6).
Kerberos relies on a number of specialized principals, which we formalize as different subsorts of principal: clients,
servers, TGSes and KASes are modeled by the type families client, server, TGS, and KAS, respectively, each parame-
terized by a realm. For example, the assertions
KAS : realm → type. ∀R : realm. KAS R <: principal R
declares the type of KASes and makes every KAS a principal within the same realm. For readability, we often omit the
realm information when restricting attention to intra-realm authentication in a single realm [9–11]. For convenience,
we introduce two auxiliary types: ts represents either a TGS or a server, and tcs additionally encompasses clients.
These relations are realized using subsorting.
Dependent types also support abstracting away the binding between keys and the principals they were issued for. By
parameterizing the type of a symmetric key by the names of the principals who share it, as in the following declaration:
shK : principal R → principal R → type.∀R.∀A,B : principal R. shK A B <: key
we can express the fact that sk37 is a short-term key shared between a particular client c3 and a particular server s7 by
means of the declarations c3 : client R6, s7 : server R6, sk37 : shK c3 s7 (subsorting reconciles the types of c3 and s7
with the types expected by shK).
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Fig. 6. The KASs role in the authentication service exchange.
While shK will tag the keys issued by the KAS and the TGS, we use dbK R A for the long-term keys that the KDC
of realm R shares with principal A. Appropriate subsorting declarations allow keys of the ﬁrst type to be embedded
in a network message for distribution, but prohibit the transmission of a long-term key (see [11,18] for details). While
all keys used in the fragment of Kerberos speciﬁed here are atomic, composite keys could be handled by declaring
appropriate types and operators.
We use the type Rset for the transited ﬁeld; this is constructed from the empty ﬁeld Rnil : Rset and the operator
(_ˆ_) : realm → Rset → Rset.
A comprehensive discussion of the typing declarations used in our analysis of Kerberos 5 can be found in [11,18].
While we found this typing layout convenient, it was by no means the only possibility. Indeed, MSR does not impose
any restriction on what types are declared and for what purpose (however, type checking requires that they are used
consistently). In particular, we could have simulated a completely untyped setting by deﬁning a single type, saymsg, and
declaring every object in our formalization of this type. Doing so would have forced us to maintain more bookkeeping
information as explicit facts within rules (see next section) rather than segregating it within themore structured types we
used. As observed in [13,17], this would have made our speciﬁcation harder to get right since errors now automatically
caught by the type checker would then be subject to visual inspection only. Furthermore, the speciﬁcation task itself
would have been more complex as MSR supports (and the MSR prototype [20] implements) a sophisticated form
of type reconstruction that allows omitting the vast majority of typing annotations, in practice. In order to maintain
conceptual simplicity, all declarations reported in this paper are fully type-reconstructed.
In this work, we did not look for type ﬂaw attacks, mostly because this would havemeant conducting our investigation
at a much lower level than we were prepared to do: only a speciﬁcation of the full ASN.1 syntax of Kerberos 5 [40]
would have allowed us to draw any meaningful conclusion. Furthermore, because of the redundancy built into this
syntax, we doubt the required extensive low-level speciﬁcation would have yielded any interesting result. It should
be noted however that the very typing infrastructure of MSR provides one of the best approaches available for the
discovery of type ﬂaw attacks [14]. Indeed, subsorting offers a convenient method to declare what combination of
ﬁelds could reasonably be confused with each other (e.g., a nonce and a key) and which certainly could not (e.g., a
nonce and a ticket). This contrasts with other strongly typed languages, which typically disallow any type confusion,
and all untyped formalisms, for which any two entities can be confused.
4.1.2. States, rules, roles, and the formalization of Kerberos 5
The state of a protocol execution is determined by the network messages in transit, the local knowledge of each
principal, and other similar data. MSR formalizes individual bits of information in a state by means of facts consisting
of a predicate name and one or more terms. For example, the network fact N({AK,C, tK}kT ) indicates that ticket
{AK,C, tK}kT is present on the network. The network predicate N is declared as N : msg → state.
A protocol consists of actions that transform the state. In MSR, this is modeled by the notion of rule: a description
of the facts that an action removes from the current state and the facts it replaces them with to produce the next state.
For example, Fig. 6 describes the actions of the KAS. Ignoring for the moment the leading ∀K : KAS RC and the
outermost brackets ([. . .]) leaves us with a single MSR rule—rule 2.1, as indicated above the arrow—that we will use
to illustrate characteristics of MSR rules in general.
Rules are parametric, as evidenced by the leading string of typed universal quantiﬁers: actual values need to be
supplied before applying the rule. The middle portion ([· · ·] ⇒ [· · ·]) describes the transformation performed
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Fig. 7. The Client’s role in the authentication service exchange.
by the rule: it replaces states containing a fact of the form N(C, T , n1) with states that contain a fact of the form
N(C, {AK,C, tK,Rnil}kRC,T , {AK, n1, tK, T }kRC,C ) but which are otherwise identical. The existential marker “∃AK :
shKCT ” requiresAK to be replaced with a newly generated symbol of type shKCT ; this is how freshness requirements
are modeled in MSR. The if . . . line lists additional constraints, used as in [18], that must be satisﬁed by a state if the
rule is to be applied to it: ValidK models a validity check (implementing local policy) performed by K , and clockK
looks up K’s local time. Unlike the facts on the left-hand side of the rule, these constraints are consulted but neither
added to nor removed from the state as a result of applying the rule. Section 4.1.3 describes the formal assumptions we
make about the constraints we use here.
Rule 2.1 completely describes the behavior of the KAS; in general, multiple rules may be needed, as when modeling
the actions of the client in the AS exchange. Coordinated rules describing the behavior of a principal are collected in
a role. A role is just a sequence of rules, parameterized by the principal executing them (the owner of the role)—the
“∀K : KAS” above the brackets in Fig. 6.
A two-rule role describing the client’s actions in the AS exchange is shown in Fig. 7. Rule 1.1 describes the client’s
sending of her request; rule 1.2 describes her processing of the reply. The predicate MemASE is used to coordinate
the two rules: ﬁring rule 1.1 creates the predicate, which saves data about the request; ﬁring rule 1.2 consumes this
predicate, ensuring that the processed reply corresponds to an earlier request. The predicate AuthC , created when the
client processes the KAS’s reply, caches the ticket and keyAK for use in the TG exchange. (In particular, this predicate
appears on the left-hand side of rule 3.1, given in Appendix 5, by which C sends a request message to T .)
The remaining roles in this formalization are presented in Appendix 5.
An MSR speciﬁcation may appear to have little in common with the Alice-and-Bob notation traditionally used to
discuss cryptographic protocols. Yet, the skeleton of a set of MSR roles is readily obtained from this informal notation:
there is one role for each involved principal and every sequence of a receive followed by a send gives rise to a rule. The
MSR speciﬁcation is completed by the choice of an appropriate typing infrastructure (the recent MSR prototype [20]
will automatically infer the type of most variables present in a rule) and memory predicates as needed. However, there
is no push-button way to derive an MSR speciﬁcation from a protocol described using the Alice-and-Bob notation
in general since the latter is ambiguous, which is one of the reasons why MSR was introduced in the ﬁrst place
[18,13,25].
4.1.3. Constraint details
We now summarize the constraints that are used in our formalization of Kerberos; some of these appear in the rules
that are given in Appendix 5.
The constraints ValidP , for various principals P , implement the local policies of KASes, TGSes, and application
servers. In particular, these model whatever conditions these various servers impose (beyond those inherent in the
protocol) on the client’s requests.
The constraints clockP , for various P , check the local clock of the principal P ; if clockP (t) holds, then the time on
P ’s local clock is t .
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The constraint DesiredHop implements a client’s local policy in choosing the next realm for which it will request a
cross-realm ticket. In particular, if DesiredHop(C, S, RT , Rn) holds then C will attempt to obtain a ticket for realm Rn
if she already has a TGT for realm RT and her goal is to obtain a ST for the server S.
The constraint CloserRealm implements a TGS’s selection of a realm that closer to the destination realm requested
by the client than the TGS’s own realm. In particular, CloserRealm(Ti, Tn, Ti+1) holds if, when Ti is asked to provide
a ticket for Tn, the best (i.e., closest to Tn) realm for which it can provide a TGT is Ti+1 	= Ti . In general, if Ti shares
a key with Tn then Ti+1 will be Tn; otherwise, Ti will use a hierarchical approach or a hardcoded path to determine
Ti+1. We assume that realms are organized so that the iterated use of CloserRealm(Ti, Tn, Ti+1) by TGSes in different
realms never produces a cycle in the authentication path, and that if Tn 	= Ti then Ti+1 	= Ti .
4.1.4. Execution semantics
We will now expand on the execution model of MSR by concentrating on a high-level deﬁnition of execution step
and the critical notion of a trace. The interested reader is invited to consult [15] for a detailed deﬁnition of execution,
and is referred to [16] for a discussion of how these two levels relates to each other.
Simplifying somewhat from [16], the execution semantics of MSR operates by transforming conﬁgurations of the
form 〈S〉R , where the state S is a multiset of ground predicates (as introduced in the previous section), the signature 
keeps track of the symbols in use (with their type), and the active role set R = (a11 , . . . , ann ) records the remaining
actions of the currently executing roles (i), and who is executing them (ai).
The basic execution step is expressed by judgments of the form PC −→ C′ where P is the protocol speciﬁc-
ation, and C and C′ are consecutive conﬁgurations. This judgment is deﬁned by the following two rules (simpliﬁed,
see [15]):
(P, )〈S〉R −→ 〈S〉R,
a

inst
P〈S, []lhs〉R,((lhs→∃x.rhs),)a −→ 〈S, [, c/x]rhs〉R,
a
,c
rw
The ﬁrst rule prepares a role for execution by inserting it in the active role set: it associates it with the principal a that
will be executing it. Note that the same role can be loaded arbitrarily many times by any principal (subject to some
typing limitations), which provides support for the concurrent execution of multiple sessions and therefore multisession
attacks. The second inference describes the application of a rule r = lhs → rhs: if an instance []lhs of its left-hand
side appears in the state, it is replaced by the corresponding instantiation of the right-hand side after instantiating the
existential variables x with new constants c. The rule r is removed from the active role set, and c is added to the
signature.
An abstract execution step is a quadruple C r,−→C′, where C and C′ are consecutive conﬁgurations, r identiﬁes
the rule from P being executed, and  stands for the overall substitution: it comprises  above, which deals with the
universally quantiﬁed variables of r , and c/x which handles its existential variables. An abstract execution step is just a
compact yet precise way to denote rule application. It is reasonable to think about it as a partial function from C, r and
 to C′. We say that r if applicable in C is there is a substitution  and a conﬁguration C′ such that C r,−→C′ is deﬁned.
A trace T is then a sequence of applications
C0
r1,1−→ C1
r2,2−→ · · · rn,n−→ Cn+1.
Here, C0 is the initial conﬁguration of T . In the context of Kerberos, the state component S0 of the initial conﬁguration
contains only the predicates used in constraints and the intruder’s knowledge (see next section); in particular, it does
not contain any network message or memory predicate. The initial signature 0 within C0 contains the name of all
principals and their type (client, server, KAS, etc.), their keys, realms, etc. The initial active role set 0 is empty.
Because execution in any (networked) computer system proceeds by discrete steps and started at a speciﬁc moment
in time (in the last 60 years), we only need to consider traces that are ﬁnite. This also means that a generic trace will
contain a ﬁnite, although a priori unbounded, number of applications of inference inst for the same role .
While we rely on the notion of sequence in describing traces, this deﬁnition could be generalized to a lattice with
minimum C0 and maximum Cn to account for action independence. We will however stick to sequences for simplicity.
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4.2. Intruder model
Our analysis of Kerberos 5 is based on a variant of the classic Dolev–Yao intruder model [24,36]. This attacker can
traditionally intercept and originate network trafﬁc, encrypt and decrypt captured messages as long as he knows the key,
concatenate and split messages at will, generate certain types of messages (e.g., keys and nonces) but not others (e.g.,
principals), and access public data such as principal names. Because we are considering cross-realm authentication, we
need to extend this list with a few additional capabilities, in particular compromising a realm (which gives the intruder
access to any dbK in that realm) and creating fake clients and servers as well as their long-term keys in compromised
realms.
This set of capabilities is given a precise speciﬁcation in MSR. For this purpose, the knowledge of the intruder is
modeled as a collection of facts I (m) (“the intruder knows message m”) distributed in the state. The intruder himself
is represented as the distinguished principal I by means of the declaration I : principal. Each capability is expressed by
means of a one-rule role that can be executed only by I. For example, the speciﬁcations of networkmessage interception,
message splitting and nonce generation have the following form:
I[ ∀m : msg.
N(m)
INT⇒ I (m)
] I⎡⎢⎢⎣
∀m1,m2 : msg.[
I (m1)
I (m2)
]
CPM⇒ I (m1,m2)
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
I[
· NG⇒ ∃ n : nonce. I (n)
]
.
Notice that these roles identify I as their owner (above the left brace) rather than a generic principal (introduced by
a universal quantiﬁer in the previous section).
Because our speciﬁcation of Kerberos distinguishes among different types of keys (short-term shK keys and long-
term dbK keys), the generic capability “the intruder can decrypt an encrypted message assuming he has the encryption
key” must be split among two rules:
I⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
∀R : realm ∀C : client R ∀A : ts R
∀ k : shK R C A ∀m : msg[
I ({m}k)
I (k)
]
SDC⇒ I (m)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
I⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
∀R : realm ∀A : tcs R
∀ k : dbK R A ∀m : msg[
I ({m}k)
I (k)
]
NG⇒ I (m)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
Recall that ts stands for either a TGS or a server, and that tcs is either a ts or a client. The rules for encryptions are
similar.
The rules implementing the other traditional Dolev–Yao intruder capabilities are deﬁned similarly. A complete list
can be found in [11]. Modeling cross-realm authentication requires an additional set of rules to express capturing a
realm, populating it with ﬁctitious clients and servers, etc. For example, realm capture is modeled as follows:
I⎡
⎢⎣
∀R : realm ∀A : tcs R ∀k : dbK R A
· ⇒ I (k)
if compromised(R)
⎤
⎥⎦ .
Here, the fact compromised(R) marks a realm as compromised by the intruder. This rule states that the intruder has
access to all long-term keys held by the KDC of a compromised realm. This simple rule is at the basis of our analysis
of cross-realm authentication in Kerberos 5 [16]. Additional cross-realm intruder rules can be found in [16].
The intruder rule excerpts given above are a simple transliteration of the natural-language Dolev–Yao capabilities,
with typing adding minimal complication. This format is appropriate to the veriﬁcation technique described in this
paper, which is based on theorem proving. Clearly, rules of this form would be totally inadequate for a methodology
rooted on state exploration as they allow the intruder to generate an inﬁnite set of messages (most of which are of no
use to a Kerberos principal) or even to run in place by repeatedly performing actions and undoing them later. Protocol-
speciﬁc intruder rules that do not suffer from this deﬁciency can be devised and expressed in MSR, as this language
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is open-ended and methodology-independent. We have done so for small protocols in unpublished work. Such rules
would be appropriate for a model-checking approach.
4.3. Rank and corank
We now turn to the deﬁnition of the rank and corank functions discussed in Section 3.2. Recall that they are used
to guide the inductive proofs of authentication and conﬁdentiality, respectively, with each protocol and intruder rule
corresponding to a case in the induction. In order to use them, we need to deﬁne their values on the antecedent and
consequents of a rule. Just as multisets collect facts and facts are built up from atomic terms in the language of the
protocol, we inductively deﬁne rank and corank functions starting with their values on atomic terms and then deﬁning
the effects on these values of the operations used to build non-atomic terms. The extension of the deﬁnition of corank
from terms to facts requires some human consideration of the predicates in the protocol signature; we note some general
principles which appear to be applicable to this process.
4.3.1. Rank
Recall that the k-rank relative tom0 is intended to capture the amount of work done using the key k to encrypt exactly
the message m0. We start with the deﬁnition of rank for terms. Let k be a key, t, t1, t2 terms, and m0 a msg. Then we
deﬁne the k-rank of t relative to m0, denoted by k(t;m0), by
k(t;m0) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0, t is an atomic term,
k(m1;m0) + 1, t = {m1}k, k(m1;m0) > 0,
0, t = {m1}k, k(m1;m0) = 0, m1 	= m0,
1, t = {m0}k,
k(m1;m0), t = {m1}k′ , k′ 	= k,
max{k(t1;m0), k(t2;m0)} t = t1, t2.
(1)
If t is atomic, then no work has been done to encrypt the message m0 and we set the rank equal to 0. If t is exactly
the message {m0}k we set the rank equal to 1. Encrypting any message of positive k-rank with the key k increases the
rank by 1 as additional work has been done using k, while encryption with k′ 	= k has no effect on k-rank. Similarly,
encrypting a message (other than exactly m0) that has k-rank 0 with the key k leaves the k-rank at 0. The rank of
the concatenation of two messages equals the larger of the ranks of the constituent messages. The k-rank of message
digests, which play a role in the detailed formalization in [11] but not here, is deﬁned as for encryptions, namely a
message digest function keyed with k has the same effect as encryption using the key k. We will be concerned primarily
with whether or not the k-rank relative to m0 of a message is positive, i.e., whether or not {m0}k is contained within
the message.
The extension of rank from terms to facts is straightforward; intuitively, the number of nested encryptions of m0
using k which must have occurred to produce a certain predicate equals the maximum number of such encryptions
which were needed to produce one of the arguments of the predicate. Formally, for k a key, m0 and m of type msg, and
t , ti terms, and P any predicate in the protocol signature, we deﬁne the k-rank of a fact F relative to m0 (k(F ;m0)) by
k(P (t1, . . . , tj );m0) = max1 i j k(ti;m0). In particular, for network facts we have k(N(m);m0) = k(m;m0)
and for terms in the intruder’s memory we have k(I (t);m0) = k(t;m0). For a multiset A of ﬁnitely many distinct
facts, we deﬁne the k-rank of A relative to m0 by k(A;m0) = maxF∈A k(F ;m0) if A 	= ∅, and let k(∅;m0) = 0.
Given a rule
[F1, . . . , Fi] ⇒ ∃x1 . . . ∃xn[G1, . . . ,Gj ],
we say that this rule increases (preserves, weakly decreases, etc.) k-rank relative to m0 if
k({F1, . . . , Fi};m0) < k({G1, . . . ,Gj };m0)
(=,  , etc., respectively).
We now outline how the notion of rank is used to prove data origin authentication for a protocol. This task is divided
in to two parts: we ﬁrst show that the intruder speciﬁcation is unable to encrypt a message m0 of interest with a key k
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unless he possesses k, and then we show that if {m0}k is ever created, then an honest principal must have done so as
part of the protocol. This is expressed by the following property.
Any reasonable formulation of the intruder should be such that the intruder cannot do cryptographic work using the
key k (as measured by relative k-rank) without possessing the key k.
Property 10. If an intruder rule rI can increase k-rank relative to m0, then the left-hand side of rI contains I (k).
The proof proceeds by cases on the rules deﬁning the intruder capabilities. As expected, this holds for our formal-
izations of the Dolev–Yao intruder in Section 4.2. This proof can be found in [11].
Our approach to data origin authentication is outlined by the following theorem, which might be viewed as a loose
analog of Schneider’s rank function theorem [42] for our rank functions; as with rank in general, this is straightforward
to extend to the case of message digests and other cryptographic operators [11].
Theorem 1. If k(F ;m0) = 0 for every fact F in the initial state of a generic trace T and no intruder rule can increase
k-rank relative tom0 then the existence of a fact F with k(F ;m0) > 0 in some non-initial state of T implies that some
honest principal ﬁred a rule which produced a fact built up from {m0}k .
Proof (Sketch). If no intruder rule can increase k-rank relative to m0, some honest participant must have ﬁred a rule
which increased this rank from 0 to some positive value. A fact of positive k-rank relative to m0 must contain (as an
argument to the predicate) a term of positive k-rank relative to m0. By induction on the structure of terms, this term
must be built up from the term {m0}k . 
We then authenticate the origin of {m0}k (assuming this was not present at the beginning of the trace—neither as
intruder knowledge nor in a message in transit in particular) by ensuring the conﬁdentiality of k, invoking Property 10,
and then determining which honest principal(s) could create {m0}k . One might also consider traces in which a certain
rank is at most i in the initial state and then a fact of rank j > i appears in a later state; however, we do not need this
here.
4.3.2. Corank
Recall that the E-corank relative to m0 is intended to capture the minimum amount of work, using keys from the set
E, needed to obtain the atomic message m0. As for rank, we start by inductively deﬁning corank on terms and then
extending the deﬁnition to facts.
Let E be a set of keys, m0 an atomic term of type msg, and t , t1, and t2 terms. Then we deﬁne the E-corank of t
relative to m0, denoted by ˆE(t;m0), as
ˆE(t;m0) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∞, t is atomic, t 	= m0,
0, t is atomic, t = m0,
ˆE(m1;m0) + 1, t = {m1}k, k ∈ E,
ˆE(m1;m0), t = {m1}k, k /∈ E,
min{ˆE(t1;m0), ˆE(t2;m0)}, t = t1, t2.
If t is atomic then no work using keys from E is required to obtain m0 if t = m0, while no amount of such work can
extract m0 from t 	= m0. The number of decryptions using keys from E needed to obtain m0 from {m}k is the same as
or 1 more than the number needed to obtain m0 from m, depending on whether k /∈ E or k ∈ E. A message m0 can be
extracted from the concatenation of two terms by extracting it from one of these two terms (since we are assuming that
m0 is atomic), whence the ﬁnal case. When message digests are used, as in our more detailed formalization, a message
digest function keyed with k ∈ E will produce a term of inﬁnite E-corank relative to m0 as no amount of work can
extract m0 from the resulting message, assuming that m0 is not equal to the result of the message digest operation.
For a memory predicate P with j arguments, a natural ﬁrst deﬁnition of the E-corank of P(t1, . . . , tj ) relative to m0
would be min1 i j ˆE(ti;m0). However, we wish to have principals store messages in predicates without necessarily
compromising the conﬁdentiality of these messages (e.g., an honest principal storing an unencrypted session key in
memory does not correspond to the intruder knowing this key). If a certain argument to a predicate P will never be
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placed on the network, we will ignore the term it contains when determining the E-corank of P . We thus modify the
tentative deﬁnition given above to instead take the minimum to be over those i for which ti might be placed on the
network (to state this imprecisely). We leave a general approach to this problem for future work; for the moment, we
have used this intuition to guide our extension of corank to facts as follows.
LetE be a set of keys,m0 an atomic term of typemsg,m of typemsg, and t , ti be terms. We may deﬁne theE-corank
relative to m0 of facts built from the predicates N(), I (), AuthC , and DoneMutC as follows; the deﬁnitions for other
predicates appearing in our formalizations similarly follow the intuition given above
ˆE(N(m);m0) = ˆE(m;m0),
ˆE(I (t);m0) = ˆE(t;m0),
ˆE(AuthC(t1, t2, t3);m0) = ˆE(t1;m0).
For a multiset A of facts, we deﬁne the E-corank of A relative to m0 by ˆE(A;m0) = minF∈A ˆE(F ;m0) if A 	= ∅,
and let ˆE(∅;m0) = ∞.
We identify the conﬁdentiality of m0 with the fact I (m0) being prohibited from appearing in a generic trace T .
As an immediate consequence of the deﬁnition of the corank of facts, we see that if there is some set E of keys such
that no fact of E-corank 0 relative to m0 appears in T , then m0 remains conﬁdential throughout T .
We expect that in any reasonable intruder formulation, if an intruder decreases the amount of decryption with keys
in the set E needed to learn a message, then she either knows some key protecting that message or she creates that
message herself. We formalize this as the following property.
Property 11. If an intruder rule rI can decrease E-corank relative to m0, where I does not have access to m0 simply
by virtue of the type of m0, then the left-hand side of rI contains I (k) for some k ∈ E or rI freshly generates m0.
Again, it is proved by cases on the rules deﬁning the intruder capabilities. As expected, this property holds for our
formalizations of the Dolev–Yao intruder in Section 4.2, as proved in [11].
We prove conﬁdentiality using the following result; like Theorem 1, this may be viewed as roughly analogous to
Schneider’s rank function theorem.
Theorem 2. If ˆE(F ;m0) > 0 for every fact in the initial state of a generic trace T , no intruder rule can
decrease E-corank relative to m0, and no honest principal creates a fact F with ˆE(F ;m0) = 0, then m0 is secret
throughout T .
Proof (Sketch). The MSR fact that corresponds to the intruder knowing a message m0 has E-corank equal to 0 relative
to m0 for every set E of keys. By the conditions of the theorem, this fact can appear in no state of the trace. 
We may thus show that m0 is conﬁdential by ﬁnding some set E of keys, each of which is conﬁdential (which may
require additional corank arguments) and which satisﬁes the conditions of this theorem.
4.4. Veriﬁcation excerpts
We now present a selection of formal theorems corresponding to the protocol properties discussed in Section 3.1;
these give the ﬂavor of how our formal results are stated and proved and illustrate the interconnected rank and corank
arguments. Theorem 3, formalizing Property 1, is an example of an authentication guarantee that the client has when she
sees a certain message on the network. Theorems 4 and 5 formalize secrecy results, stated informally as Properties 2
and 3, the former for an intra-realm key and the latter for a cross-realm key; as these concern secrecy, they rely
upon corank arguments. Theorem 6 corresponds to Property 5 and gives an authentication guarantee to a TGS about
the origin of a cross-realm ticket; this rank argument relies on the secrecy property captured in Theorem 5 and
the corresponding corank arguments. (Secrecy properties in the CS exchange rely on this authentication property,
completing the intertwining of rank/authentication and corank/secrecy.)
Each of these results refers to a generic ﬁnite trace, which as discussed in Section 4.1.4 may comprise multiple
concurrent executions of Kerberos. We do not put a priori constraints on the initial conﬁguration of this trace except
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those noted explicitly in the statements. For the most part, these are requirements that the intruder does not know the
long-term keys of relevant principals.
We include somewhat detailed proof sketches for the theorems in this section. The full proofs, which add slightly
more detail, rely on tens of lemmas that capture the effects of the various MSR rules on rank and corank and which are
proved by inspection of the rules.
We shall again observe that although these results are speciﬁc to Kerberos 5, the methodology we used is general.
Indeed, the overall structure of statements and proofs would not differ substantially for other protocols, nor would the
way they are organized.
4.4.1. Authentication of KAS to client
We begin with the formal correspondent of Property 1, which ascertains that whenever the client processes a well-
formed reply from the KAS, then the KAS indeed generated it (assuming the long-term key they share has not been
compromised). This is a typical example of a data origin authentication statement, all of which have the form “if a
principalA receives amessage {m}k encryptedwith a key k thatA shares withB and k is unavailable to the attacker, then
B must have generatedm and originated {m}k”. Theorem 3 specializes this statement to the scenario under consideration
and formalizes it relative to the MSR speciﬁcation. The presence of the opaque ticket slightly complicates this result.
Theorem 3. For C : client RC , kC : dbK RCC, T : TGS RC , AK : shK C T , n1 : nonce, and tK : time, if the initial
state of a ﬁnite trace contains neither I (kC) nor any fact of positive kC-rank relative to (AK, n1, tK, T ), and if the
fact N(C,X, {AK, n1, tK, T }kC ) appears in some state of a trace for some X : msg, then at some point earlier in the
trace some K : KASRC ﬁred rule 2.1, consuming the fact N(C, T , n1), freshly generating the key AK : shKC T , and
producing the fact N(C, {AK,C, tK,Rnil}kT , {AK, n1, tK, T }kC ) for some kT : dbK RC T .
Proof (Sketch). The fact N(C, {AK,C, tK,Rnil}kT , {AK, n1, tK, T }kC ) has kC-rank 1 relative to (AK, n1, tK, T ); we
consider which protocol participants could ﬁre a rule that increases this rank. By hypothesis, no such fact appeared
in the initial state of the trace. Additionally, kC was not initially known to the intruder and so is never known to the
intruder (because long-term keys are not leaked or transmitted in a message); thus the intruder could never ﬁre a rule
increasing kC-rank relative to AK, n1, tK, T . Inspection of the principal rules shows that the only honest principal who
will ﬁre such a rule is some K : KAS RC . 
4.4.2. Conﬁdentiality of intra-realm AK
Theorem 4. For RC : realm, C : client RC , T : TGS RC , C, T 	= I , kC : dbK RCC, kT : dbK RCT , AK : shK C T ,
and n1 : nonce, if the initial state of a ﬁnite trace does not contain I (kC) or I (kT ) and some K : KAS ﬁres rule 2.1,
freshly generating AK and creating the fact N(C, {AK,C, tK,Rnil}kT , {AK, n1, tK, T }kC ), then no state of the trace
contains the fact I (AK).
Proof (Sketch). We claim that no fact with {kC, kT }-corank relative to AK equal to 0 appears in the trace.
If any KAS ﬁres a rule which decreases {kC, kT }-corank relative to AK , then that rule freshly generates AK and, if
the newly created fact in the resulting multiset is N(C, {AK,C, tK,Rnil}kT , {AK, n1, tK, T }kC ), the {kC, kT }-corank
relative toAK of thismultiset equals 1. BecauseAK is freshly generated here, no previousmultiset in the trace contained
a fact with ﬁnite {kC, kT }-corank relative to AK , nor can any KAS later ﬁre a rule which decreases {kC, kT }-corank
relative to AK .
Additionally, no client, TGS, or server rule decreases {kC, kT }-corank relative to AK .
The facts I (kC) and I (kT ) do not appear in the initial state of the trace; these keys can never be lost during the
protocol, so these facts never appear in the trace under consideration. By hypothesis, K freshly generates AK , so I
cannot freshly generate AK . Thus, I does not ﬁre any rule which decreases {kC, kT }-corank relative to AK .
As a result, no fact of {kC, kT }-corank 0 relative to AK , in particular I (AK), occurs in any multiset of the
trace. 
4.4.3. Conﬁdentiality of cross-realm AK
Theorem 5. For C : client RC , T : TGS Ri , T ′ : rTGS Ri Rj , C, T , T ′ 	= I , kRi,Ti+1 : dbK RiT ′, if no state of the
trace contains either I (kRi,Ti+1) or I (AK), and if some T : TGS Ri ﬁres rule 4′.1, freshly generating AK ′ : shKC T ′
and creating the fact N(C, {AK ′, C, tCRT , (RkˆRs)}kRi ,Ti+1 , {AK
′, nCR3 , t
CR
T , T
′}AK) for some Rk : realm, Rs : Rset,
tCRT : time, nCR3 : nonce, then no state of the trace contains the fact I (AK ′).
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Proof (Sketch). We claim that no fact with {AK, kRi,Ti+1}-corank equal to 0 relative to AK ′ in the trace.
If any TGS ﬁres a rule which decreases {AK, kRi,Ti+1}-corank relative to AK ′, then that rule is 4′.1 and freshly
generates AK ′. Furthermore, if the newly created fact in the resulting multiset is N(C, {AK ′, C, tCRT , (RkˆRs)}kRi ,Ti+1 ,
{AK ′, nCR3 , tCRT , T ′}AK) then the {AK, kRi,Ti+1}-corank relative to AK ′ of this multiset equals 1. Because AK ′ is
freshly generated here, no previous multiset in the trace contained a fact with ﬁnite {AK, kRi,Ti+1}-corank relative to
AK ′, nor can any TGS later ﬁre a rule which decreases {AK, kRi,Ti+1}-corank relative to AK ′.
If someK : KASﬁres a rule that decreases {AK, kRi,Ti+1}-corank relative to k : shKCT ′, then that rule ﬁring freshly
generates k; this means k 	= AK ′, which is freshly generated by T . Additionally, no client or server rule decreases
{AK, kRi,Ti+1}-corank relative to AK ′.
The fact I (kRi,Ti+1) does not appear in the initial state of the trace; this long-term key cannot be lost during the
protocol. Combined with the assumption on AK , neither of the facts I (AK) and I (kRi,Ti+1) ever appear in the trace
under consideration. By hypothesis, T freshly generates AK , so I cannot do this; thus I does not ﬁre any rule which
decreases {AK, kRi,Ti+1}-corank relative to AK ′.
As a result, no fact of {AK, kRi,Ti+1}-corank 0 relative to AK ′, in particular I (AK ′), occurs in any multiset of the
trace. 
4.4.4. Authentication of TGT and authenticator
The following theorem authenticates the origin of the TGT and authenticator when these are processed as part of
a request for a cross-realm ticket. A very similar theorem, which we omit, authenticates the origins of these objects
when they are presented as part of a request for an intra-realm ST.
Theorem 6. For RC,Ri, Rj , Rk, Rn : realm, C : client RC , T : TGS Ri , AK : shK C T , t, t ′ : time, Rs : Rset,
kRk,Ti : dbK RkT , tC : time, Tn : TGS Rn, and n3 : nonce, if the initial state of the trace did not contain I (kRk,Ti )
or any fact with positive kRk,Ti -rank relative to AK,C, t, Rs, if no state of the trace contains I (k) for Tk : TGS Rk
and k : shK C Tk , and if T ﬁres rule 4′.1, consuming the fact N({AK,C, t, Rs}kRk,Ti , {C, t
′}AK,C, Tn, n3), freshly
generating AK ′ : shK CT ′, and creating the fact N(C, {AK ′, C, t ′′, (RkˆRs)}kRi ,Ti+1 , {AK
′, n3, t ′′, T ′}AK) for some
t ′′ : time, T ′ : TGS Rj , kRi,Ti+1 : dbK RiT ′, then earlier in the trace some T ′′ : TGS Rk ﬁred rule 4′.1, freshly
generating AK and creating the fact N(C, {AK,C, t, Rs}kRk,Ti , {AK, n
′
3, t
′′′, T }
AK ′′) for some n′3 : nonce, t ′′′ : time,
andAK ′′ : shKCT ′′.Furthermore, after this earlier ﬁring of rule 4′.1,C ﬁred rule 3.1, freshly generating nCR3 ′ : nonce
and creating the fact N(X, {C, t ′}AK,C, Tm, nCR3 ′) for some X : msg, Rm : realm, and Tm : TGS Rm.
Proof (Sketch). T ’s ﬁring of rule 4′.1 consumes a fact of kRk,Ti -rank 1 relative to AK,C, t, Rs. As this rank was 0
for every fact in the initial state of the trace, some rule ﬁring during the trace must have increased this rank.
No client or server can ﬁre a rule that increases kRk,Ti -rank relative to AK,C, t, Rs; if Rk 	= Ri , then no KAS can
either. If Rk = Ri , then no TGS can ﬁre a rule that increases this rank because the CloserRealm constraint returns
a different realm than the one in which the TGS consulting it is located. For the remainder of this proof sketch, we
assume we fall into the Rk 	= Ri case; the Rk = Ri case is similar.
Because I (kRk,Ti ) does not appear in the initial state of the trace, and thus in any state of the trace, the intruder
cannot increase the rank in question. Thus, some TGS must have ﬁred a rule to increase this rank. Rule 4.1 cannot
increase kRk,Ti -rank relative to AK,C, t, Rs, so this must have been a ﬁring of rule 4′.1. By inspection, we see that
this ﬁring of rule 4′.1 must have been done by some T ′′ : TGS Rk , freshly generated AK , and created the fact
N(C, {AK,C, t, Rs}kRk,Ti , {AK, n
′
3, t
′′′, T }
AK ′′) for some n
′
3 : nonce, t ′′′ : time, and AK ′′ : shK C T ′′.
T ’s ﬁring of rule 4′.1 also consumes a fact of AK-rank 1 relative to C, t ′. As AK was freshly generated by T ′′’s
ﬁring of rule 4′.1, every fact in the initial state of the trace hadAK rank 0 relative toC, t ′ and so some rule ﬁring during
the trace (and after T ′′’s ﬁring of rule 4′.1 to generate AK) must have increased this rank. By inspection, no KAS,
TGS, or server rule can increase AK-rank relative to C, t ′. By hypothesis, the conditions of Theorem 5 are satisﬁed, so
I (AK) does not appear in the trace; thus no intruder rule can increase this rank. Thus, the ﬁring of some client rule must
have increased AK-rank relative to C, t ′. By inspection, this must have been rule 3.1, ﬁred by C to freshly generate
nCR3
′ : nonce and create the fact N(X, {C, t ′}AK,C, Tm, nCR3 ′) for some X : msg, Rm : realm, and Tm : TGS Rm. 
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5. Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we have reported on a multiyear effort aimed at applying the techniques of formal analysis to a real-
world protocol as opposed to the simpliﬁed abstractions commonly examined in the formal methods literature. The
popular Kerberos 5 authentication protocol [40] provided a practically relevant case study. The overall result has been
the most detailed formal veriﬁcation of any deployed protocol to date (to our knowledge). Because real-world protocols
are signiﬁcantly more complex than their commonly studied abstractions, this effort pioneered substantial advances to
the protocol veriﬁcation methodology that relies on theorem proving: the use of dependently typed languages as ﬂexible
formalization vehicles, the interleaving of authentication and conﬁdentiality proofs based on distinct but cooperating
mathematical tools, and the coordinated reﬁnement of speciﬁcations, properties and proofs. These methods allowed us
to prove numerous properties of Kerberos 5, in particular authentication, conﬁdentiality and structural soundness, hence
conﬁrming that it is a robust and well-designed protocol. We also discovered a number of innocuous but unexpected
behaviors that we called “anomalies”. Our analysis of the cross-realm authentication support of Kerberos 5 clearly
exposed the fragility of this protocol with respect to the notion of trust.
Discussions about this work started our interactions with the IETF Kerberos working group; these have continued
in connection with other parts of our project, and the renewed interest in anonymous tickets has connected to our work
here.
The Kerberos protocol suite is complex and continually subject to extension as new real-world authentication needs
are addressed. This provides additional interesting problems for study; we are now in the process of analyzing some
of these protocol extensions.
The recent development of a prototype for our speciﬁcation language, MSR, opens the doors to automating, at least
partially, the proof methodology underlying this and future veriﬁcation efforts.
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Appendix A. Additional roles
Fig. A1 shows the client role for requesting TGTs.
Fig. A1. The client’s role in TGS exchange.
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Fig. A2. TGS response to an intra-realm service ticket request.
Fig. A3. TGS response to a cross-realm TGT request.
Fig. A4. The client’s role in the application server exchange.
Fig. A5. The server’s role in the service ticket exchange.
Fig. A2 shows the TGS role for responding to a request for an intra-realm ST, i.e., for a server in the TGSs own
realm.
Fig. A3 shows the TGS role for responding to a request for a cross-realm TGT, i.e., for a TGS in a different realm
than the TGSs.
Fig. A4 shows the client role for requesting a ST.
Fig. A5 shows the server role.
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